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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NORTHWEST CARRIERS, INC. and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiffs,
Case No.

vs.

17170

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SECOND INJURY FUND, and
HERBERT MERZ I
Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS

NATURE OF CASE
This is a Workman's Compensation Act case dealing with a
claim filed by injured workman, Herbert Merz, against his
employer, Northwest Carriers, Inc. and its insurance carrier,
the Utah State Insurance Fund (hereinafter plaintiffs) for injuries
he suffered in an industrial accident on August 11, 1974.

(R.

1)

DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
On May 8, 1980, the Administrative Law Judge entered an Order
requiring Second Injury Fund Payment.

Therein Mr. Merz was

found to be permanently and totally disabled from a combination
of his industrial and nonindustrial physical impairments
as well as factors of employability.

(R. 250)

On May 19,

1980, plaintiffs
filed
a timely
Motion
for
Review
asserting
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
provided by
the Institute
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the right to reimbursement of 60% of the compensation paid
by plaintiffs from the Special Fund (hereinafter, defendant)
pursuant to §35-1-69 U.C.A.

(R. 253)

The Administrative Lai

Judge responded on May 29, 1980 with Supplemental Findings
of Fact, conclusions of Law and Order granting only a 15%
reimbursement (R. 257-260) for the amount of pre-industrial
injury physical impairment without considering employabilitj
factors.
An

'
additional Motion
for Reveiw by plaintiffs reassert1

the right to a 60% reimbursement was filed on June 2, 1980
\R. 262) which was denied by the Industrial Commission on Jt
16, 1980.

(R.

267)

A timely Petition for Writ of Review

(R. 260) was fil1

and a Writ of Review (R. 274) was issued bringing this
matter before the Supreme Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Order of the
Industrial Conunission denying reimbursement from the Specia:
Fund to the State Insurance Fund of 60% of the amounts
advanced to Herbert Merz in compensation benefits as requir:
by §35-1-69 U. C.A. be reversed with the matter to be remand!
for an appropriate order of reimbursement to be entered.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts of this matter are not subject to
dispute.

They are presented to give the Court the backgro~

which brings this claim before the Court.
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On August 11, 1974, Herbert Merz suffered an injury to
his back while in the course of his employment for plaintiff,
Northwest Carriers, Inc.

(R. 16 3)

Because of the complicated nature of the medical difficulties,
inter alia, experienced by Mr. Merz his case came to a hearing
and was referred to a medical panel for evaluation.
examination on October 18, 1976,

From an

(R. 157-165) the panel

found that he was suffering from a 55%'whole man physicial
impairment.

40% of that impairment was due to the industrial

injury of August 11, 1974 and 15% impairment was the result of
a prior accidental injury.

(R.

161)

The panel was of the opinion that a decompression at one
nerve root level in Mr. Merz' back at a later date might be
beneficial to him.
May 17, 1977.

(R.

(R. 161)

That operation was performed on

185)

After a period of recuperation to allow his condition
to stabilize, the medical panel again placed his permanent
partial loss of bodily function or impairment at 40% for the
industrial accident with 15% predating that event.

(R.

196)

On January 16, 1980, the medical panel chairman, Boyd
Holbrook, who had become a treating physician expressed the
opinion that "I do not believe that this man will be able
to return to gainful employment . .

(R.

241)

Taking into consideration the above opinion by Dr. Holbrook,
the fact that plaintiff had nearly paid the statutory maximum
of 312 weeks of compensation, the fact that Mr. Merz is 58
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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years of age

'th only an eighth grade education, the fact ti

Wl.

had tried to be employed without success, that he is not a
good candidate for rehabilitation, and the fact that he has
a 55% physical impairment; the Industrial Commission rightful
found Mr. Merz permanently and totally disabled from gainful
employment in its Order of May 8, 1980.

(R.

250)

Plaintiffs did not and do not object to such a finding(
disability.

However~

plaintiffs did file a Motion for Revie1

because no consideration was given to their right of reimbur:
ment from the Special Fund of the proportionate share of the
100% disability not directly attributable to the industrial

injury.

§35-1-69 U.C.A.

The Industrial Commission later acknowledged the right1
reimbursement, but only allowed it to the extent of fifteen
percent.

The basis for that decision by the Commission is ti

employability factors are not to be considered in analyzing
the obligation of the Special Fund in §35-1-69 U.C.A.

(R.

257)

It is the position of plaintiffs that where there is a
pre-existing condition the employer is only responsible for
the proportion the bodily impairment from the industrial ace:
bears to the total disability whether that disability be toti
or some lesser percentage.
ARGUMENT
THE EMPLOYER IS ONLY RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPENSATION AND MEDICAL CARE ATTRIBUTABLE
TO THE INDUSTRIAL INJURY.
The Industrial Commission takes an interesting approach
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to the issue of the apportionment in a permanent and total ci

such as the one currently before this Court.

However, the

approach is in error and fails to take into account the clear

ui

statement of the responsibility of the employer and the employer's
insurance carrier in §35-1-69 U.C.A.

The pertinent parts are

as follows:

I(

; I

tl

. . compensation and medical care . . . shall
be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries,
but the liability of the employer for such
compensation and medical care shall be for the
industrial injury only and the remainder shall
be paid out of the Special Fund . . . .
A medical panel . . . shall review all medical
aspects of the case . . . the Industrial Commission shall then assess the liability for
compensation and medical care to the employer
on the basis of the percentage of permanent
physical impairment attributable to the industrial
injury only and the remainder shall be payable
out of the said Special Fund . . • .
(emphasis added)
The clear and unequivocal language of §35-1-69 is to the
effect that the employer is responsible for the industrial
injury only.

The employer is not responsible for factors that

were not caused by the industrial injury.

In the case at bar,

the date of the applicant's birth, his education, the availability of jobs, his intelligence quotient, the pre-existing
physical impairment, all of which contribute to his being
found permanently and totally disabled were not caused by
the industrial injury.

In order to accomplish what the

Industrial Commission is attempting by their order, it would
be necessary for legislative amendment.
The case of McPhie v. Industrial Comm'n, 567 P.2d 153
(Utah 1977) stands for the proposition that the Second Injury
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Fund is to pay pursuant to §35-1-69 U.C.A. and §35-1-67, th,
"remainder" of whatever is left to be paid after the employ;
has discharged its liability.

The case of Intermountain He<

care v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977); White et al. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1979); and Intermount 0
Smelting v. Anthony Capitano, Sup. Ct. No. 16530 (March 24,
have further clarified the meaning of "remainder".

The empi

is responsible only for the industrial accident, the permaner
loss of bodily function or impairement attributable to thei
trial accident and the percentage share that the permanent
partial loss of bodily function bears to the overall disabil
suffered by the injured workman for temporary total and medi
benefits.
To rule otherwise would be directly in contradiction of
public policy which dictated the passage of the legislation
in the first place:
While at first glance it might appear that the
apportionment rule favors the employer and
nonapportionment the employee, in practice the
nonapportionment rule proved the worse of the
two evils from the standpoint of the handicapped
~orker.
As soon as it became clear that a particular state had adopted a rule requiring an
employer to bear the full cost of total disabiliE
for the loss of the crippled worker's disability
for loss of the crippled worker's remaining leg
or a:m, employers had a strong financial incentive
to.discharge all handicapped workers who might
bring upon them this kind of aggravated liabilil:Y·
Under either rule, then, the compensation system
operated unsatisfactorily in the case of previously impaired workers: Under apportionment
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they received far less than their actual condition
required to prevent distitution; under nonapportionme~t they lost their jobs.
Second Injury
Funds, which have been adopted in all but four
states, are the solution to this dilemma. The
u~ual provision makes the employer ultimately
liable only for the amount of disability attributable to the particular injury occurring in
his employment, which the Fund pays the difference between that amount and the total amount
to which the employee is entitled for the combined effects of his prior and present injury.
(emphasis added) .
Larson, Workman's Compensation Law, Vol 2, Section 59.31 pp.
10-285 to 10-288.
It is clear from the wording of §35-1-69

u.c.A.,

supra,

that it is intended not only as a benefit to the employee, but
also as a limitation to the extent of liability of an employer
so that the public policy stated by Prof. Larson can be satisfied.

The employer is not responsible for factors contri-

buting to disability other than the actual physical impairment
caused by the industriat injury.
'
Therefore, in the case
at bar, plaintiffs are entitled to

a reimbursement of 60% of the benefits for temporary total
compensation and medical compensation advanced to Herbert Merz
through the years.
CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission of Utah acted in excess of
its administrative powers in failing to order reimbursement to
plaintiff of 60% of the medical and temporary total disability
payments advanced to Herbert Merz.
interpreted §35-1-69

u.c.A.

The Commission erroneously

to mean that the employer is
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responsible for employability factors in addition to the pe
centage of physical impairment caused by the industrial
accident.

The result, contrary to §35-1-69, is that the em

ployer is made to pay for an injured employee's age, lack o
education, lack of intelligence, lack of job availability,
and the fact that because of the above an employee is not
a good candidate for vocational rehabilitation.
The Industrial Commission shall . . . assess
the liability for compensation and medical care
to the employer on the basis of the percentage
of permanent physical impairment attributable
to the industrial injury only and the remainder
shall be payable out of the Special Fund . . .
(emphasis added)
§35-1-69 u.c.A.

This case should be remanded to the Industrial Cornrniss1
with instructions that an Order be entered directing the
Special Fund reimburse plaintiffs 60% of the amounts paid
for medical care and for te!!lporary total compensation.
DATED this

;;J.;)

day of

A

5 0 Ten West Broadway Buildinc
alt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 363-2727
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